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Introduction 
 
If this symposium tells us anything, it is that the ‘transition debate’ remains 
alive, well and hotly contested! And so it should, considering what is at 
stake in how we politically and theoretically navigate capitalism, not only 
in its past but also its present. It is perhaps a testament to the centrality of 
the problems bound up in the transition debate that the contributions to 
this symposium are so searching. More so, it is a testament to the quality 
of our interlocutors’ work that these problems have received such 
thoroughgoing examination. We are privileged and grateful for the 
serious, critical and productive engagements offered by each of the 
authors in this symposium.  
Such is the breadth and depth of these contributions that our 
response is, regrettably, partial. In particular, there are numerous 
disagreements over characterisations and interpretations of the historical 
material we handled in the How the West Came to Rule (HWCR) which 
require considerably longer engagements than what we can offer here. 
There are also various original contributions that help ‘thicken’ what 
historical material should be included in this debate. Finally, there are 
important calls to broaden the research programme to include 
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jurisdictional accumulation (Pal), the ‘biography of one product’ (Banaji), 
and ‘articulation’ (Medved). Together, such contributions demonstrate the 
value of productive disagreement.  
For these reasons, our reply focuses on some key themes that have 
emerged in the course of this symposium where our disagreement has 
been less productive, where we are perhaps talking past each other, and 
where it appears we have collectively become cemented into intractable 
and irreconcilable positions. We hope in engaging with these subjects we 
might offer readers new ways of thinking through the differences in our 
respective positions.  
There are three key themes we explore. In the first section, we 
discuss an enduring issue in Marxist International Relations: ‘the 
problematic of the international’ and the problems of methodological 
internalism. We examine how our interlocutors have responded to this 
problematic and why we consider these responses insufficient. In 
particular, we suggest that the source of our disagreement is grounded in 
two divergent understandings of the problem of internalism itself. In doing 
so, we reassert the value of our chosen response to the problematic – 
uneven and combined development (UCD). In the second section, we 
explore the tensions identified by our critics in this use of UCD. More 
specifically, we respond to the criticisms that our extension of UCD as a 
‘transmodal’ general abstraction is problematic by further explicating the 
significance and role of general abstractions in Marxist theory – a point 
yet addressed by our critics. In the third section, we return to the 
fundamental question at the core of the transition debate: what is 
capitalism and how do we theorise it? Here, we re-situate the problem in 
terms of how we understand and theorise social relations that are not 
reducible to the capital relation. We argue that using UCD allows us to 
identify and understand how the multiplicity of social relations and 
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historical processes combine in order produce and reproduce the 
capitalist mode of production. We argue that such an understanding helps 
shed light on how different forms of violence, oppression and exploitation 
– and the struggles around them – relate to capitalism and the resistance 
to it.  
 
The ‘Problematic of the International’  
 
A key concern in HWCR was not only empirically tracing but also 
theorising the role of intersocietal relations as constitutive of the making 
of capitalism. We argued that it was this missing intersocietal component 
of the existing historical sociology on the topic that had kept it so 
hamstrung and resolutely Eurocentric. In doing so, we suggested that 
extant accounts – especially Political Marxist approaches – fell prey to the 
trap of methodological internalism. As such, Political Marxism was unable 
to provide an adequate theorisation of relations between societies and 
offer a truly ‘international historical sociology’ of capitalism’s emergence. 
Spencer Dimmock and Maia Pal’s contributions to this symposium 
contest this claim, by arguing that Political Marxism’s conception of ‘social 
property relations’ can and does provide an adequate response to ‘the 
problematic of the international’. This is because social property relations 
capture a three-way dialectical relationship: (1) the interaction of humans 
with nature; (2) the exploitative relation between the direct producers and 
their surplus-appropriators, and; (3) the relations within and between the 
ruling classes (Dimmock xxx; Pal xxx; Post: xxx). Given that ‘classes, 
particularly ruling classes, do not simply compete, go to war, or 
collaborate or trade with one another within the boundaries of their 
respective polities, countries or nations’, we are told social property 
relations ‘fully encompass inter-societal interaction and the influence of 
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that interaction on the reproduction or transformation of those relations’ 
(Dimmock XXX). As such, these property relations are not ‘limited a priori 
by internal or external conditions’, nor confined to a single society, but are 
rather ‘central for the construction of political spatiality’ itself (Pal xx).  
However, these responses betray a misunderstanding of our uses 
of internalism and are therefore an inadequate response to the 
‘problematic of the international’. We take internalism to mean, firstly, the 
methodological commitment to understanding the origins and expansion 
of capitalist modernity as a product of developments endogenous to 
Europe. Conceptualising social change as an immanent property of 
societies, Eurocentric internalism locates the emergence of capitalism 
exclusively within the hermetically-sealed and socio-culturally coherent 
geographical confines of Europe. As a result, Europe is transformed into 
the permanent ‘core’ and ‘prime mover’ of world history and the model 
from which all other forms of development are contrasted and judged 
(HWCR: 4-5). 
Implicit in this conception is a second, more traditional, 
understanding of internalism or ‘methodological nationalism’: the 
conflation of society with a particular nation or territorial state as the 
primary ‘unit of analyis’. Both of these meanings of internalism have 
specific spatial registers (Europe; the nation-state) and ‘inside-out’ logics 
of causality (from ‘Europe to colony A’; from ‘England to colony A’) as Pal 
correctly notes.  
There is, however, a third way we understand internalism that is 
foundational to our argument – the problem of ‘ontological singularity’.1 
This refers to the assumption that by working outward form a theory of a 
single social structure (for example, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, etc.) 
                                                          
1 Rosenberg 2006.  
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one may arrive at a theoretical conception of multiple societies. An implicit 
assumption of this method is that differences between social structures 
and their interactions are not accorded any analytical or explanatory 
value. In short, societal difference does not factor into a theoretical 
conception of ‘the international’: hence our critique of Immanuel 
Wallerstein for subsuming intersocietal determinations under an 
‘overriding operative logic of a singularly-conceived world-system’ 
(HWCR: 16). The argument is not that inter-state relations and geopolitics 
are unimportant to Wallerstein’s analysis or theory. Instead, our critique is 
that, as Mladen Medved puts it (XX), the ‘concept of the intersocietal is 
unthinkable in Wallerstein as the capitalist world-system is one society’. 
In contrast, Pal transforms our quantitative conception of 
sociological singularity (in Political Marxist terms ‘feudal social property 
relations’, ‘capitalist social property relations’) into a qualitative one that 
refers to a historically specific articulation of political spatiality; that is, 
states with clear inside/outside demarcations of the type only found in the 
capitalist epoch. Similarly, Dimmock (XX) mischaracterises UCD as a 
‘geopolitical theory’. These important slippages allow Pal and Dimmock to 
counter our criticism that Political Marxism is methodologically internalist 
since social property relations is not ‘limited a priori by internal or external 
conditions’ and encompass relations within and between individual states 
(Pal XX). But ‘multiple territorialities’ or ‘multiple jurisdictions’ (Pal XX, 
emphasis added) are not the same as multiple (and differentiated) 
societies, as the former can be predicated on the same singular type of 
social property relations.  
Put differently, the problem of internalism is not simply a question of 
the character of political spatiality. It lies instead with the very fact of 
quantitative and qualitative multiplicity itself: that societies are plural and 
different. That the problem of – and solution to – internalism is conceived 
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in terms of how political space is organised suggests proponents of UCD 
and social property relations are talking past each other when it comes to 
the ‘problematic of the international’. To say social property relations can 
‘encompass inter-societal interaction’ or include ‘geopolitical dimensions’ 
does not meet the stronger demand we make of historical sociology – that 
it must include the intersocietal as an ontological premise that is 
irreducible to any particular set of social relations. 
It is in light of this stronger demand that we find Political Marxist 
accounts lacking. For example, a particularly clear statement of Political 
Marxism’s methodological internalism in the sense described above is 
provided by Benno Teschke, whose work is explicitly marshalled by Pal in 
making her counter-critique. In his landmark treatise, The Myth of 1648, 
Teschke writes: 
 
My core theoretical argument, developed by elaborating the principles of 
political Marxism, is that the constitution, operating, and transformation of 
geopolitical orders are predicated on their constitutive units. Social property 
relations, mediating the relations between the major classes, primarily 
define the constitution and identity of these political units. The time-bound 
balances of social forces find expression in politically constituted 
institutions…that set the parameters for class-specific, and therefore 
antagonistic, rules of reproduction.2 
 
Equally, Robert Brenner is quite clear regarding the causal sequencing of 
his deductive model: ‘form of property relations  rules for reproduction 
of the individual economic actors  long-term pattern of economic 
development/non-development’.3 Given that ‘political accumulation’ is 
                                                          
2 Teschke 2003: 7.  
3 Brenner 1986: 26-27. 
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conceived by Brenner as a particular kind of ‘rule of reproduction’,4 feudal 
geopolitics are thus conceptualised as a specific expression (not 
expressions) of a particular form of social property relations. In other 
words, geopolitics is reduced to an ontologically singular conception of 
‘the social’.  
These influences are not lost on our contributors; we see reiterations 
of such internalism when Dimmock, Post, and Pal engage with our 
substantive historical arguments. For example, we are told by Dimmock 
(XX), following Brenner’s comparative analyses of medieval and early 
modern Europe, that  
 
unless a particular society or country is conquered, and a new set of social-
property relations are installed by the conquerors, the established social-
property relations – and the outcomes of vertical and horizontal struggles 
therein – will be determinate in the face of external pressure. In other words, 
the nature of the response to this pressure, and consequent outcome of this 
response, will depend upon the nature of the social-property relations. 
 
Similarly, Charles Post (XX) takes us for task for losing sight of how the 
impact of intersocietal interactions and competition ‘are always filtered 
through the dominant social property relations and class conflicts within a 
given society’. Pal suggests (XX) that the concept of geopolitical 
accumulation is not derived from an ‘ontologically singular form’, but does 
not show how it is – or rather must be – ontologically multiple. In turn, she 
argues that ‘internal jurisdictional conflicts play a much stronger role in 
determining concepts of sovereignty’. Despite the insistence that the 
social property relations approach need not be internalist, it appears we 
are back to internal relations being ‘determinant’ in the final instance.  
                                                          
4 Brenner 2007: 71.  
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In this respect, the exact theoretical issues arising from the 
‘problematic of the international’ has somewhat eluded our interlocutors. 
Or, more likely, they would simply reject the premise of the problematic 
itself.5 Indeed, perhaps a Political Marxist would argue that ‘the 
international’ can only be understood in terms of its constitutive units, 
themselves predicated upon historically-determinant social property 
relations. This is of course a legitimate response, and we can debate the 
merits of the ‘problematic of the international’ and whether it does add 
something to understanding the origins of capitalism or any other subject. 
Nonetheless, it is incorrect to claim that Political Marxism provides an 
answer to the problematic which UCD is aiming to address or dismiss our 
criticism of the absence of such a theory in Political Marxism as ‘wholly 
inaccurate’ or a ‘misrepresentation of the social property relations 
approach’ (Dimmock XX; Pal XX). Such a response simply represents a 
misunderstanding of the problematic and what is at stake in addressing it.   
In particular, we would insist that working outward from a specific set 
of social property relations (say, feudalism) can never fully explain the 
dynamics and interactions between different sets of social relations. And, 
moreover, there will always remain a ‘surplus’ of lateral determinations 
arising from these intersocietal relations that are irreducible to any 
particular social structure. Without a theorisation of this intersocietal 
dimension of development, societal multiplicity is continually encountered 
as a phenomenon external or contingent to our theoretical premises, no 
matter how much empirical weight it may hold in concrete historical 
explanations. It is in this sense that ‘the international’ appears as an ad-
hoc untheorised addendum to an otherwise internalist analysis: it ‘enters 
                                                          
5 Pal’s contribution comes closest to this position. Similarly, it is revealing that whereas Dimmock and 
Pal seek to defend Political Marxism’s ability to theorise ‘the international’, Post is more circumspect. 
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stage-left, as a fully-formed determination whose origin is unexplained’.6 
Put differently, the concept of social property relations itself does not 
provide a theorisation of ‘the international’ as its own distinct and 
irreducible social domain. The international is, in other words, always 
derived or reduced to extant social property relations. While one might be 
able to show how social property relations can identify intersocietal 
processes, it does not contain within it the methodological premises to 
theorise such processes in a non-reductionist way.  
In short, the problem goes beyond simply incorporating intersocietal 
relations as an ‘intervening dimension’7 of concrete explanations of 
sociohistorical developments. It instead requires a reformulation of 
historical materialism’s foundational ontology in order to provide a 
substantive theoretical conception of that ‘dimension of social reality 
which arises specifically from the coexistence within it of more than one 
society’.8 Following Kamran Matin, we argue that this demands a 
reconceptualisation of Marx and Engels’ ‘double relationship’ as a ‘triple 
relationship’ encompassing humans’ relationship to: (1) nature; (2) the 
social, and; (3) the intersocietal.9 In HWCR, we sought to draw on 
Trotsky’s idea of UCD to fashion such a social theory of ‘the international’ 
without losing sight of the ways specific articulations of UCD only operate 
in and through distinct modes of production; hence, our conceptualisation 
of UCD as a ‘transmodal’ phenomenon. This then breaks with the false 
yet obstinate separation of ‘sociological’ and ‘geopolitical’ modes of 
explanation common to social and IR theories alike. But here we 
encounter an additional objection: that UCD is only applicable to 
capitalism and that any wider extension of UCD inevitably results in 
                                                          
6 Davidson (2010: 81) in a critique against the ‘two logics’ theory of imperialism.  
7 Teschke 2005: 12. 
8 Rosenberg 2006: 308. 
9 Matin 2013.  
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ahistorical arguments or descriptive trivialities. We now turn to address 
these claims. 
 
Lineages of Uneven and Combined Development 
 
Our extension of UCD to the pre-capitalist epoch is challenged by Neil 
Davidson and Charles Post, even though they both accept that 
unevenness is a general feature of world history. What they reject is that 
Trotsky’s ‘universal law’ of uneven development leads to ‘combination’ 
prior to the emergence of capitalism, but do so for rather different reasons. 
For Davidson, the problem with our conception of UCD as a ‘general 
abstraction’ is primarily two-fold.  
First, Davidson argues (XX) that the radically differentiated form 
intersocietal relations takes depends upon specific historical eras, and 
that this means ‘they cannot be subsumed in all their variety under a single 
“general abstraction”’. Yet much hangs on what kind of analytical work a 
‘general abstraction’ is supposed to be doing in theory. If the function of a 
general abstraction is to explain a given phenomenon, then surely 
Davidson is correct. But this is not, we argue, what a general abstraction 
is supposed to ‘do’. Rather, a general abstraction functions as an in-built 
assumption that identifies the existence of a general condition whose 
historically-distinctive form must be accounted by additional explanans. 
Here, the role of a general abstraction is to isolate particular objects of 
study and open up them up further investigation. This in turn raises new 
analytical questions that can only be answered through their connection 
to other abstracted ‘moments’ and concretised through rich historical 
contextualisation and analysis.  
Hence, the sheer variety of concrete instantiations of a general 
condition is exactly what we should expect a ‘general abstraction’ to 
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identify. For example, Marx’s abstraction of ‘production in general’ 
identifies a universal condition of social existence that takes radically 
different forms dependent upon different historical epochs. As a result, the 
contemporary form production takes under capitalism, can only be 
explained through more concrete determinations and abstractions (e.g. 
‘abstract labour’, ‘exchange-value’, etc.). If Davidson agrees (XX) that the 
‘whip of external necessity’ and ‘privileges of backwardness’ are general 
conditions of the unevenness of historical development, on the one hand, 
and consequently that ‘societies are likely to embody fusions of quite 
different institutions and practices, drawn from different levels of 
development’, on the other, then we would argue that UCD can be said to 
operate at a transmodal level.  
This leads to Davidson’s second point of criticism. That 
‘combination’ in Trotsky’s original meaning of the term is much more 
specific; that it refers to the ‘fusion of “backward” and “modern”’ forms 
derivative of the ‘immense difference’ between industrial capitalism and 
pre-capitalist societies wherein ‘the moment the former was introduced, 
combination became possible in a way that it had not been hitherto’. 
Consequently, once industrial capitalism emerged, ‘combination became 
inescapable, as all aspects of existing society registered the impact on 
them, to differing degrees, of this radically new means of exploitation’ 
(Davidson XX).  
Perhaps surprisingly, we are in complete agreement with Davidson 
on this point and have made nearly identical claims ourselves (HWCR: 
esp. 61-63).10 None of these claims, however, invalidate the legitimacy of 
deploying UCD to pre-capitalist periods, so long as one recognises, as we 
and Davidson suggest, the very significant qualitative differences between 
                                                          
10 Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2013: 100-101.  
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capitalist and pre-capitalist forms of UCD. At this point, the argument 
appears to be over semantics: whether ‘uneven development’ can fully 
capture the range of phenomena we seek to cover under the rubric of 
uneven and combined development.  
Yet this view is only partly correct, as there remains one substantive 
point of disagreement between Davidson and ourselves. This revolves 
around an empirical debate over the importance and extent of varieties of 
pre-capitalist social relations. Davidson argues that pre-capitalist agrarian 
societies were only differentiated at the level of the state and intra-ruling 
class relations that existed on a spectrum ranging from feudal to tributary 
modes of production. He thus rejects notions of a ‘nomadic’ or ‘slave’ 
mode of production. ‘Because of these underlying similarities it was 
possible for societies to borrow from each other and for the borrowings to 
be fully absorbed’, meaning that it is only with ‘the dawn of the capitalist 
era that “combination” actually leads to the possibility of “development” – 
that is, of moving beyond the essentially static interchanges between 
different pre-capitalist societies’ (Davidson XX).  
The issues raised by Davidson here constitutes a much more 
substantive challenge to the more general conception of UCD we apply to 
the pre-capitalist era, and there is much to debate here that lies beyond 
the scope of this reply. But even if we accept Davidson’s argument that 
there essentially existed only two forms of (tributary and feudal) class 
societies before capitalism and we accept that a combined development 
can occur within a single mode of production, as he does, then the 
historical record offers myriad examples of intersocietal exchanges 
generating forms of ‘combinations’ leading to ‘development’. Kaman 
Matin’s study of premodern Saffavid state formation, for example, 
demonstrates how the underdevelopment of private property in land was 
a consequence of Saffavid’s continuous engagement with its nomadic 
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neighbours. The resulting state-form was, however, irreducible to either 
polity, taking a ‘non-singular character’ that Matin terms an ‘amalgamated 
state formation’ – a consequence of a ‘dynamic, internationally generated 
combination (and not merely assimilation or external tributary relations) of 
the nomadic and agrarian polities in premodern Iran’.11 Our own analysis 
of the Ottoman Empire points in a similar direction, as does our more 
recent examination of the formation of the Mughal Empire that draws upon 
and extends arguments first made in HWCR (91-120, 263-269).12 In all 
these cases, the interaction of tributary and nomadic societies resulted in 
dynamic political forms that were irreducible to either polity. These 
intersocietal exchanges – most dramatically expressed through military 
conflict and war – were thus constitutive of the changing, amalgamated 
forms they took. They were, in short, a force of combined development.   
For Post, however, a combined development is restricted even 
further. It is exclusively associated with ‘the introduction of the capital-
wage-labour relation and the systematic development of labour-
productivity through labour-saving devices’ that only occurs after ‘the 
advent of industrial capitalist production’ (Post XX). The most immediate 
problem with this formulation is Post’s identification of combined 
development with the specific form of capitalist-driven combined 
development. By defining combination in this way, the historical possibility 
of non-capitalist forms of combinations is ruled out a priori. Given Post’s 
definitional conflation of combination in general with the particular form of 
combined development under capitalism, he is able to argue that our 
conception of UCD in explaining the rise of capitalism reproduces ‘the 
errors of the “commercialisation model”—assuming the existence of 
                                                          
11 Matin 2007: 438.  
12  Nişancıoğlu 2016; Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2017.  
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capitalist rules of reproduction to explain the emergence of capitalist 
property relations’ (Post XX).  
Post does not, however, provide any textual evidence from HWCR 
to back-up this claim. And, for good reason: none exists. Throughout the 
text, we are at pains to emphasise how the operation of UCD is 
conditioned by and articulated through historically-distinct forms of social 
relations and processes: thus our discussions of feudal, tributary, 
nomadic, and slave-based modes of productions and their corresponding 
‘rules of reproduction’ vis-à-vis the differentiated dynamics of UCD. 
Post’s (XX) entire argument regarding the inapplicability of ‘combined 
development’ to the pre-capitalist epoch rests on his assertion that ‘[p]re-
capitalist geopolitics did not lead to systematic economic development in 
those societies incorporating new methods of production’. Such pre-
capitalist intersocietal interactions instead ‘tended to undermine 
economic development because of the relative stagnation of labour-
saving technological development before capitalism’.  
But Post’s argument here is yet again left as an assertion that lacks 
any empirical or even citational substantiation.  Nor does Post engage 
with the mass of evidence detailing the substantial technological and 
social developments we provide in HWCR, which draws on the latest 
historiographical literatures on late Medieval and early modern world 
history. What we sought to demonstrate there was that the idea that 
developments in the productive forces were ‘highly episodic’ and often 
took a ‘once and for all’ (Post XX) character before capitalism was based 
on a one-sided and now largely discarded conception of pre-capitalist 
development.13 And, moreover, that such processes of technological and 
                                                          
13 For overviews, see Allen 2000, Wickham 2008, and Persson 1991 and 2014. We therefore agree 
with Davidson’s (XXX) contention that the feudal and tributary modes of production entailed an 
immanent tendency to develop the productive forces. What the theory of UCD nonetheless demands is 
that this conception of ‘immanence’ must incorporate both relations within and between societies. To 
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social dynamism in pre-capitalist societies were often a response to the 
pressures and opportunities generated by intersocietal dynamics.   
We show in Chapters 3 and 4, for example, how the tributary 
practice of ‘caging’14 allowed for the absorption of techniques, capacities 
and organisational forms of disparate societies into an integrated and 
dynamic system of ruling class reproduction that entailed significant 
developments to the productive forces. In Chapters 5 and 7, we further 
analyse how capitalism was built on the combination of a multiplicity of 
labour processes in various locales stretching from Barbados to Banda, 
back to London and Amsterdam. It is also important to note that the 
imposition of new – or reconstruction of old – social structures as a result 
of war and conquest is much less uncommon in history than Political 
Marxists have argued, particularly in the case of colonial conquests and 
wars.  Indeed, the twin processes of imposition and reconstruction often 
go together as exemplified in the post-1492 Americas and early modern 
Southeast Asian colonies (HWCR: Chapters 5 & 7). 
Post’s claim (XX) that our theoretical development of UCD introduces 
so much contingency into the historical analysis that it makes our 
arguments ‘waiver between simple description and causal indeterminacy’ 
is, therefore, based on the above-noted misapprehension of the theory: 
one that again identifies UCD with an exclusively ‘geopolitical’ mode of 
explanation. This is evinced in Post’s argument regarding the differential 
sociohistorical impact of the demographic collapse following the Black 
Death that is presented as a refutation of our own theorisation of the 
process. This is so because, according to Post, we do not account for 
                                                          
take just one example: the dynamism of Ottoman tributary relations was fundamentally dependent upon 
developments in agrarian production in support of geopolitical accumulation and vice versa (HWCR: 
99-104). 
14 That is to say, the dual process whereby, on the one hand, territories conquered by tributary empires 
would assimilate tributary social relations into their own pre-existing forms while, on the other hand, the 
conquering tributary state would habitually absorb the local customs, laws, forms of social organisation, 
and individuals of the conquered territories (van der Pijl 2007: 63, 67; cf. HWCR: 70, 102-103).  
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these differences. Yet this is not the case. In HWCR, we draw upon 
Brenner and other scholars’ analyses of the ways in which the 
demographic collapse was highly uneven (both socially and 
geographically) as its effects were mediated and conditioned by the 
variegated balances of class forces within and across different European 
societies.15 Since no textual evidence from HWCR is provided by Post to 
substantiate his claim that we argue otherwise, forgive us for quoting 
ourselves at length to put the matter to rest: 
 
the long-term agrarian revolts precipitated by the Black Death spurred 
variegated forms of revolution and counter-revolution around seigniorial 
rule, re-ordering feudal social relations in ways that it would eventually prove 
unable to recover from. Where seigniorial reaction was successful, 
however, depended on the balance of class forces and antecedent 
processes of internal differentiation (88, emphasis added). 
 
The last point concerning the significance of these differences in the 
balance of class forces and processes of internal differentiation are 
examined earlier in the chapter where we primarily focus on developments 
within England where the Black Death most notably hastened the demise 
of the old feudal order (HWCR: 79-85). We then go on to explicate a key 
reason behind these divergent outcomes between Western and Eastern 
Europe in general, specifically the variegated relations between land and 
labour in these regions, and then re-state Brenner’s thesis regarding the 
differential paths of development between England and France in 
particular (HWCR: 88-90). Perhaps we should have flagged our 
discussion of Brenner’s thesis earlier and provided a more detailed 
empirical examination of these processes given that this has been a 
                                                          
15 See further, Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2016b.  
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source of confusion in other reviews of our work.16  Nevertheless, it is 
there.17 
 It would appear, then, that Post’s (XX) charge of ‘causal 
indeterminacy’ derives from the mere fact that we reject the ‘analytic 
primacy of social property relations and class conflict’ and, therefore, 
refuse to provide any ‘ordering of determinations’ at the ‘heart of 
materialist social theory’. But the latter does not follow from the former. 
That is to say, one can certainly reject the ‘analytic primacy’ of social 
property relations – here referring to internal social relations – without 
giving up the idea that some determinations are more important than 
others. 
 Indeed, we conceive the role of class struggle and changes in the 
relations of production as absolutely fundamental to theoretically 
explicating the rise of capitalism. But, crucially, we do so by 
conceptualising these developments within their wider intersocietal 
contexts demonstrating the structural connections between them in a way 
that transcends any conception of ‘the international’ as simply 
‘contingent’. From the perspective of UCD, the peculiarities of any given 
society’s development are a necessary (albeit highly variegated) outcome 
of this broader intersocietal milieu. As diverse and differentially situated 
societies interact, they continuously impact upon one another’s 
                                                          
16 See Bieler 2016; Braude 2015.  
17 Similarly, Post’s (XX) more general claim that our ‘assessment of the relative weight and impact of 
different “vectors” [of UCD] are historically problematic, and often simply inaccurate’ rests on a number 
of important confusions regarding other historical arguments we make. For example, Post takes issue 
with our claim that the de-militarisation of the English nobility – a significant factor cited by Brenner and 
others in the development of English agrarian capitalism – was a result of the country’s relative 
‘geopolitical isolation’ that was a distinctly intersocietal condition arising from the European continent’s 
preoccupation with the Ottoman Empire. Post argues that this could not be the case since ‘inter-lordly 
warfare within England was effectively banned in 1485’. Yet even if we accept the problematic claim 
that the English nobility was de-militarised once and for all in 1485 – rather than it being a more 
staggered and drawn-out process – Post’s periodisation still fits squarely with our own narrative of the 
geopolitics of the Long 16th Century (i.e. 1450-1650); the opening salvo being the fall of Constantinople 
in 1453. Post’s historical claim about the timing of the English nobility’s de-militarisation therefore 
supports – rather than contradicts – our own argument.   
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(re)production instigating various forms of combined development. 
Consequently, while specific patterns of societal diversity may be 
contingent, ‘the fact of this diversity itself is not’.18 This interactive 
dimension of social change imbues the historical process with a highly 
unpredictable character generating widely diverse but still theorisable 
outcomes. As such, societal difference should not be visualised as a result 
of the immanent properties of a society’s endogenous development, but 
rather ‘dependent on a whole web of “necessary but contingent” 
interactions’.19 
That Post views our structural analysis of the relationship between 
these ostensibly ‘internal’ and ‘external’ determinations as resting on 
‘contingent’ arguments demonstrate the limits of Political Marxist 
conceptions of ‘the international’. This is one of the reasons we share 
Perry Anderson’s understanding of the origins of capitalism ‘as a value-
added process gaining in complexity as it moved along a chain of 
interrelated sites’.20 This is a conception of capitalism’s origins (and 
reproduction) that rejects – and seeks to go beyond – any spatio-
temporally singular conception of causality: for example, the ‘freeing’ of 
the peasantry in the English countryside as the sole ‘sufficient condition’ 
for capitalism.21 Instead, our analysis points to the accumulation of many 
different ‘necessary conditions’ that once combined transform into a 
‘sufficient condition’. This de-centred or multi-perspectival conception of 
causality is integral to UCD, which entails a methodology capable of 
capturing the multiplicity of different causal factors – spatio-temporally 
variegated ‘causal chains’ – as internally and structurally related to one 
                                                          
18 Rosenberg 2006: 316. 
19 Cooper 2013: 592; cf. Anievas 2016. 
20 Anderson 2005: 251. 
21 This was the case even for Marx who, despite all his attention to the expropriation of the direct 
producers, still did not view this process as in and of itself enough to produce capitalism, but rather only 
led to the ‘dissolution’ of existing production relations (HWCR: 215-222).  
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another. In other words, UCD reconciles ‘causal pluralism’ (for lack of a 
better term) into a single theoretical framework.22 But once multiplicity and 
difference are established as potentially relevant conditions for 
capitalism’s emergence, the question that obviously remains is: what is 
capitalism?   
 
Inside and Outside Capitalism  
 
One of the most interesting themes emerging from this symposium is the 
variations and differences in each contributors’ conceptions of capitalism. 
Echoing a tendency we identified in HWCR, these conceptions of 
capitalism have polarised between the expansive and the narrow. For 
example, Dimmock, Post and Pal’s capitalism is defined in the relatively 
narrow terms of the market-dependent capital relation, whereas Jairus 
Banaji’s (XXX) conception is more expansive – an entire epoch 
characterised by the ‘increasing subordination of production to capital’. 
Significantly, such conceptions determine the spatial and temporal scope 
of our histories of capitalism. 
In this section, we only briefly discuss the relative merits of each 
positions because, across them, we suggest there is a more fundamental 
and pressing concern. Between these divergent accounts is a shared 
problem – an inadequate theorisation of how capital relates to social 
relations that are irreducible to or historically independent of capital. There 
is much at a stake – both theoretically and politically – in how we approach 
this issue. For if the primary criterion in evaluating the utility of a social 
theory is its capacity in explaining ‘really existing’ history, then the problem 
of defining capitalism is not so much a question of how ‘big’ or expansive 
                                                          
22 See Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2016b.  
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it is. It’s a question of how well it captures and explains concrete 
sociohistorical processes.  
In HWCR, we sought to demonstrate that the distinctive power of 
Marx’s method lies precisely in how his explanations avoided the 
reduction of social reality into simplified and elegant abstractions. Instead, 
they took place by the expansion and complexification of the object under 
study. Marx’s abstractions are heuristically useful by what elements of 
concrete reality are opened up for further exploration, not by what 
elements of reality they exclude. The progressive incorporation of ever-
more concrete determinations in turn entails a re-constitution of the 
original abstraction when applied to ‘really existing’ history.  As such, the 
specific content of any given category is not rigidly fixed, but ‘developed 
in their historical or logical process of formation’. 23  
We sought to apply a similar method in understanding the rise of 
capitalism wherein our original conception of it24 was progressively 
modified through our engagement with the history of capitalism’s 
becoming. This involved incorporating into the definition of capitalism 
those wider assemblages of social relations and processes systematically 
geared toward the reproduction of the capital relation, but not reducible – 
either historically or logically – to that relation alone. Such a conception 
entails differentiating between capital as a ‘simple’ transmodal social 
relation, on the one hand, and the historically-delimited capitalist mode of 
production, on the other.  In so doing, it draws attention to the multiple 
ways by which the competitive accumulation of capital based on the 
exploitation of wage-labour – Davidson’s preferred definition25  – 
                                                          
23 Marx quoted in Sayer 1987: 21. 
24 In the article out of which HWCR developed, we defined capitalism as ‘a distinctive mode of 
production characterised by the systemisation of competitive accumulation primarily based on the 
exploitation of wage-labour’ (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2013: 82fn24). 
25 Davidson taxes (XX) us for not specifying precisely what we mean by the ‘capital relation’. As this 
formulation should make clear, we understand the capital relation as being defined by two mutually 
constitutive and equally important dimensions: the ‘vertical’ relation between capital and labour, and; 
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presupposes a broader array of social relations that makes this 
accumulation possible. These social relations can take various forms, 
such as coercive state apparatuses, (specific) ideologies and cultures of 
consent, or forms of power, domination and exploitation that are not 
immediately given in or derivative of the ‘simple’ capital relation, such as 
unwaged labour, slavery, debt-peonage, racism, patriarchy, etc. (see 
HWCR: 8-10, 220-221).  
By contrast, the conception of capitalism offered by Post et al. takes 
place through an explicit abstraction from such relations. This results in a 
highly abstract model of capitalism predicated upon a singular spatio-
temporal vantage point – the 16-17th century English countryside – which 
is then directly applied via the comparative method to additional case 
studies (e.g. the Low Countries, absolutist France, pre-Civil War United 
States, etc.).26 Brenner himself does not shy away from the fact that this 
conception of capitalism is essentially an ‘ideal-type’27 built upon an 
analysis of the specific history of one and subsequently two countries 
(England and the Northern Netherlands).28  
 The problem with this conception of capitalism – shared by Post, 
Dimmock and Pal alike – is not simply that it is too ‘thin’. The problem is 
that it doesn’t get us very far in explaining either the actual history of 
capitalism or, perhaps surprisingly, its’ historical specificity. As some 
Political Marxists have acknowledged, the simple existence of ‘market-
dependence is not a sufficiently precise criterion’ to understand the 
                                                          
the ‘horizontal’ relations among many capitals (cf. Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2016a: 76). Though we 
agree with Davidson that this process of competitive accumulation based on the exploitation of wage-
labour constitutes the animating ‘logic’ of capital, we are at pains to emphasise how other social 
relations irreducible to the capital relation alone can also be constitutive of capitalism’s ‘logic of process’. 
26 See Brenner 2001; Wood 2002; Post 2002; Teschke 2003.  
27 See Brenner 1999: 44fn11. 
28 The extent to which Brenner’s study of the development of capitalism in the Low Countries simply 
reconfirmed or altered the model of capitalist property relations derived from his earlier analysis of the 
English case is open to debate: cf. Wood 2001; Post 2002; Davidson 2012: 415-416, 425; Knafo and 
Teschke 2017.  
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historical determinacy of capitalist property relations. For, as Teschke and 
Knafo explain, ‘market dependency was not an uncommon phenomenon, 
even in the late Middle Ages or the early modern era and is often read as 
a classical indicator of Smithian logics of market development’.29  
The market dependency of economic agents (including wage-
labourers) has been a structural feature of numerous societies prior to 
advent of capitalism in the early modern English countryside as well as in 
later societies Political Marxists correctly view as non-capitalist.30 Indeed, 
numerous recent historical works have provided invaluable analyses of 
the depth and degree of market-oriented activities in Medieval Europe31 
in ways fundamentally challenging the Political Marxist notion of a ‘self-
sufficient’ peasantry that would ‘generally produce their own food’ and 
only ‘enter the market to supplement their “subsistence/safety first 
strategies”’.32 In a passage directed in part as a critique of Brenner’s work 
(but equally applicable to objections raised by Post and Dimmock), 
Jessica Dijkman argues that the ‘idea that peasants were by nature 
subsistence-oriented and only turned to the market if they were forced to, 
has proved incorrect’. She also correctly rejects neo-classical economists’ 
idyllic picture of ‘peasants always ready and even eager to engage in 
specialisation and market-oriented production’.33 Acknowledging the fact 
                                                          
29 Knafo and Teschke 2017: 5.  
30 Davidson (2003: 52-59) provides an example of the latter: the 17th-century Scottish Highlands where 
clans became market-dependent because the land’s soil was too poor to grow crops, but nonetheless 
remained feudal. Regarding the former, Emigh (1998) shows how 15th-century Tuscany was 
characterised by all three of Brenner’s conditions for the rise of agrarian capitalism – fixed-term leasing, 
market-dependent agents (including the prominent use of wage-labour), and landlords’ inability to 
extract surplus by extra-economic means. Yet again these preconditions did not lead to the 
development of capitalist property relations.  
31 For an overview, see Perrson 2014. 
32 Wood 2002: 55; cf. Post 2018: XX; Dimmock 2018: XX. A recent study by Dijkman (2011) provides 
a wealth of quantitative and qualitative data demonstrating that market-dependency was a pronounced 
structural feature of pre-16th century England, Holland, and Flanders. What is more, both Holland and 
Flanders were by 1500 characterised by a greater magnitude of market-dependent agents than 
capitalist England with respect to their structural dependence on purchasing their subsistence needs. 
Thanks to Jessica Dijkman for discussing these findings with us. 
33 Dijkman 2011: 314; see also, Persson 2014.  
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that peasants could and did willingly enter market relations in ways that 
could unintentionally result in them becoming market-dependent over time 
does not – and emphatically should not – mean accepting a neo-Smithian 
model of capitalist development (see HWCR: 81-85).34  
In fine, the Political Marxist conception of capitalism is both too 
abstract and insufficiently historicist. It therefore suffers from what Jairus 
Banaji’s (XX) terms the problem of ‘residualism’: ‘the tendency…to treat 
major strands in the earlier history of capitalism as a dress rehearsal for 
industrial capitalism’. He finds such a tendency within our work as well, 
noting how our use of primitive accumulation presupposes a capitalism 
waiting to happen. Similarly, Banaji argues that our deployment of UCD – 
with its emphasis on multiple, amalgamated and co-existing forms or 
modes of production – further reproduces this residualism. Banaji 
suggests the missing Marxist history of merchant capitalism might offer ‘a 
more coherent picture of the history of capitalism itself’. Specifically, he 
invokes Sven Beckert’s Empire of Cotton35 as an example – albeit 
imperfect – of how such history-writing might take place through the 
‘biography of one product’ (Banaji XXX).  
                                                          
34  Post’s critique of this claim in HWCM rests on identifying our position as exclusively resting on the 
historical work of Jane Whittle. Drawing on Dimmock’s critique of this work, Post claims that Whittle 
focused on ‘an extremely small sample of rural settlements in eastern England’, and that her ‘own 
research demonstrated exactly the opposite off her claims—that capitalist landlords (“gentry”) were 
primary responsible for imposing market discipline on the emancipated peasants’. Irrespective of 
whether that may be the case, we in fact draw on a much larger body of historiographical literature in 
making these claims than Post is seemingly aware: see HWCR (309fns128 and 129) where we 
reference the works of Stephen Hipkin, R.W. Hoyle, Paul Glennie, Mavis E. Mate, R.M. Smith, J.R. 
Raftis, Mark Bailey, and Patricia Croot and David Parker. Moreover, whether Dimmock’s (2014) own 
research on the town of Lydd and the surrounding marshlands of Eastern Kent is much more 
generalisable than Whittle’s study is debatable. Indeed, Dimmock’s main argument that capitalist 
development was set in train by English lords leasing out their demesnes at market-level rents between 
1380 and 1420 is substantiated through an empirical analysis showing ‘one institutional lord, Battle 
Abbey, doing so on Romney Marsh to one ambitious individual, Andrew Bate, in the 1430s’ (French 
2015: 1220, emphasis original). Capitalist Patient Zero perhaps, but unlikely to prove other studies of 
the emergence of English agrarian capitalism wrong since ‘most of the evidence uncovered by the raft 
of local studies ignored by Brenner and disputed by Dimmock suggests that lords responded to the 
decline in labour in a number of ways’ (French 2015: 1221). 
35 Beckert 2014.  
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We will return to Banaji’s discussion of ‘merchant capitalism’, but 
first let us briefly respond to the charge of teleology. In particular, his 
argument that our use of terms such as ‘transitional’ certainly does 
demonstrate an unfortunate (on our part) presupposition of completion of 
something yet to come. And yet we would insist that not all causal 
arguments or, indeed, theorisations or conceptualisations of that 
causality, entail teleology. For  it is necessary to presuppose the existence 
of an historical process or event if you are to trace what produced it. For 
example, our reading of the plantation as ‘transitional’ is very much part 
of a causal argument. That is, methods developed on the plantation would 
inspire and prefigure the sort of work-regimes of industrial capitalism. 
Such a prefiguration can only really be read after the fact.  
But, moreover, the configuration of the ‘transitional’ here also helps 
us to outline a sociological (rather than historical) claim – that plantation 
slavery in the Americas was not the pristinely non-capitalist enterprise that 
it is often portrayed as by Marxists,36 but was deeply imbricated with social 
relations, processes and logics that would eventually become definitive of 
capitalism itself. Many of the work-regimes and disciplinary methods that 
would become characteristic of the industrial factory were pioneered on 
plantations. Furthermore, enslavement and the exploitation of slave 
labour remains a constitutive aspect of capitalist production today. In this 
respect, ‘transitional’ is perhaps a poor conceptualisation, and simply 
‘combination’ more effective.  
However, here we see the more substantive point that Banaji draws, 
which constitutes a fundamental challenge to the entire framework we use 
to understand the origins of capitalism – uneven and combined 
development (UCD). Specifically, UCD presupposes the co-existence and 
                                                          
36 See, in particular, Dimmock (XX) and Post’s (XX) contributions to this symposium. 
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interrelation of various social forms, relations, and processes and, under 
certain circumstances, modes of production. The combination or 
amalgamation produced by interactions between these multiple forms in 
turn generates historical change. When situated within a specifically 
Marxist method, this would appear necessary to understanding modal 
transformations (such as the transition from feudalism to capitalism) not 
least if we assume that: a) the capitalist mode of production did not appear 
all at once, fully formed; b) there is some period of co-existence between 
different modes of production in periods of transformation, and; c) that 
such co-existence would be especially pronounced intersocietally.  
For Dimmock, this is simply not a problem. Such is the resolute 
emphasis on the English countryside that processes happening 
elsewhere in the world simply do not matter. According to Dimmock (XX), 
the process of capitalist transformation in England had already been 
irreversibly completed by the 1620s, when plantations in the Americas 
were only just emerging as sites of accumulation. In this respect, the 
relations between England and the American plantations is solely a 
historical interest, wherein the social relations of plantation slavery are a 
contingent externality rather than theoretically integral to the functioning 
of capitalism. In Dimmock’s own words (XX): 
 
I disagree with the authors’ contention that slavery and other forms of extra-
economic surplus extraction in the New World and later in India through 
colonial subjection were intrinsic to capitalism per se, although they are 
certainly to be included in the history of capitalism as it actually happened. 
 
In turn, the world beyond England – ‘elsewhere’ – is theoretically 
significant inasmuch as it comparatively demonstrates the specificity and 
distinctiveness of the capital relation within England. This ‘elsewhere’, this 
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externality is severed from developments in England itself, wherein the 
analysis of it – both in its own right and in its relation to England – recedes 
into irrelevance.  
Against this, we are compelled to ask: at what point does the 
theoretical functioning of capitalism diverge from this history? Or put 
differently, what are the motivations behind not theorising these 
‘externalities’ – colonial subjugation and enslavement, for example – 
considering their empirical importance? What is the justification for their 
theoretical exclusion? Political Marxists have yet to offer an explicit 
answer to this question, but situated in their comparative approach we 
might be able to find one. We are often reminded that what motivates the 
Political Marxist approach is understanding the specificity of a particular 
path of development: why is it that English development diverged from 
Eastern European (Brenner) or French (Brenner, Wood) or American 
(Post)? Here societal difference represents an articulation of a historical 
problem (why society A and not society B?).  
Such an engagement with difference should be unsurprising for an 
approach that remains so wedded to internalist analysis, for what other 
relevance could differences between societies have other than 
comparison. By contrast, in HWCR societal alterity is understood in a 
different way – a solution to a very different problem: internalism (in each 
of the aforementioned guises). Societal difference is not only central to 
the theorisation of the intersocietal (unevenness) but also to grasping the 
interactive and relational significance of multiple forms of oppression and 
violence (combination) in the transition to and continuing reproduction of 
capitalism.  
We consider this especially important because much of the violence 
and exploitation that capitalism was built upon was done so outside of 
Europe. Bringing in the experience of non-European societies helps 
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demonstrate how many of the atrocities exported to an outside – ‘zones 
of nonbeing’37 – have been integral to the functioning of capitalism. Our 
motivation for theorising this (rather than simply historicising it) is to show 
that these were not simply historical contingencies external to the 
otherwise pristine logic of capital accumulation. For Dimmock (XX) and 
others to suggest we therefore read capitalism as ‘progressive’ is strange 
to say the least.38 To leave the history of capitalism to Europe is to turn 
away from the atrocities committed by Europeans beyond their own lands 
and to turn away from the very worst of its horrors as a mode of 
production. But more pertinently, it is to include non-European histories to 
situate the struggles conducted by the oppressed globally against these 
processes firmly within history and theory as significant and central rather 
than irrelevant and marginal.  
In contrast, Banaji (XX) responds to the same issue by arguing that 
we should consider the problem less in terms of the transition from one 
mode of production to another, but more in terms of ‘asking when and 
where production began to be subordinated to capital, and asking 
questions about the kind of capitals involved in those developments’. This 
would do away with the need to think about capitalism (and its’ origins) in 
terms of ‘co-existence’ altogether. Similarly, Medved suggests (XX) there 
can be no ‘independent’ non-capitalist mode of production ‘within’ the 
capitalist world-system. As such, the question of origins is less about co-
existence but more about how other modes of production are incorporated 
into and transformed by the capitalist world-system.   
Banaji’s reframing of the problem of capitalism’s origins leads him 
to identify the importance of histories of merchant capital. It is here, he 
                                                          
37 See Fanon (2008 2) and Gordon (2005) 
38 As Dimmock puts it (XX): ‘It also seems to me an important point that, given the association of slavery 
and other atrocities with the making of capitalism, countries in the East would be queuing up claiming 
to have made a contribution to it.’ See also Duzgun 2016.  
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argues, that we might begin to find answers to the question in terms of 
this ‘where and when’. Banaji produces a stunning list of histories for 
potential investigation, including capitalist activity spanning several 
millennia and the whole globe. He concludes by noting (XX): ‘The Roman 
fine ware industry was organised on a capitalist basis, but it doesn’t follow 
that Rome’s economy was driven by capitalism in the sense in which one 
would normally understand this’. 
In identifying these instances of capital beyond the historical (and 
geographical) scope of orthodox Marxist accounts, Banaji certainly 
challenges us (and others) to trace longer genealogies and lineages of 
practices typical of capitalism. Such a challenge is welcome, and such 
endeavours are certainly needed to deepen and expand the 
historiography of capitalism (Marxist or otherwise). Equally, we agree that 
a different kind of methodology or heuristic, which starts from a particular 
commodity or enterprise and traces its genealogy of production and 
circulation, might provide an effective method through which to conduct 
such research. We might add that this argument can be extended to not 
only how we understand capitalism but also to how we understand 
geopolitics or ‘the international’. Taking a commodity or enterprise rather 
than ‘the societal’ as the unit of analysis might radically transform how we 
conceive of socio-political space and  intersocietal interaction. Perhaps it 
might displace our own emphasis on UCD and, as such, we welcome such 
research endeavours as part of a continuing dialogue on the question of 
capitalism’s origins.  
In short, there is no denying that the ‘biography of one product’ can 
generate extremely fruitful and novel ways of understanding the operation 
of not only capitalism but of the world we live in or epochs past. Much 
recent work on global commodity chains, circulation and logistics reveals 
all kinds of operations that traditional Marxist analysis has missed, 
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especially in line with the sort of congealed violence that lies behind 
commodity production.39 However, we would note that one of the 
remarkable insights of Marx – indeed the very basis for his whole 
theorisation of the capitalist mode of production – was grounded in the 
analysis of ‘the commodity’ in general. The biography of one product 
would perhaps expose some of the concrete operations of the commodity 
form, but it is only in ‘abstraction’, as an organising principle of social 
relations – ‘relations mediated by things’ – that Marx was able to capture 
both the logic and historical specificity of capitalism as a mode of 
production.  
The advantages of this latter approach – the way in which the 
commodity-form organises and subsumes social life, rather than how 
social life organises the biography of a particular commodity – appear to 
us, for the purposes of grasping the historical specificity of capitalism, 
immensely greater. All of this being said, however, we see no reason why 
the two approaches should not be complimentary, so long as we 
acknowledge that they are doing different kinds of work historically and 
theoretically.  
This becomes especially evident in Banaji’s own research. In line 
with the partiality involved in the biography of the product, there is also a 
partiality associated with studying the history of capitalism from the 
perspective of certain enterprises and activities. There is no denying that 
there were commercial practices and capitalistic enterprises prior to the 
advent of the capitalist mode of production (see, e.g. HWCR: Chapter 7). 
And yet, in directly identifying these practices and individual enterprises 
with the capitalist mode of production itself,40 Banaji tiptoes rather 
precariously on a line that renders capitalism transhistorical. While Banaji 
                                                          
39 See, for example, Cowen (2015), Beckert (2014), Tsing (2009), Bonacich and Wilson (2008). 
40 A position that Banaji (2011: 58-61) has previously argued against.   
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is no ‘neo-Smithian’, the method he advocates makes it difficult to theorise 
and then historically account for the radical historical specificity of 
capitalism – capitalism conceived of as a distinct social structure. It is 
telling that many of Banaji’s concrete examples of capitalist activity rests 
on terms such as ‘commerce’, ‘business’, ‘enterprise’, ‘money’, ‘industry’, 
‘merchants’, ‘speculation’, ‘export’, etc. The operation or practice of these 
forms is of course easy enough to find throughout history, as Banaji’s 
impressive list demonstrates. Moreover, his work is an important 
corrective to the Political Marxist intuition that competition, markets, wage-
labour, commerce, and finance have nothing to do with capital prior to 
capitalism, as Banaji argues.  
But are these examples characteristic of the capitalist mode of 
production as such? Do they mark out its historical specificity? The issue 
is that the capitalist mode of production and indeed any of its variants – 
commercial, merchant, industrial – simply appears everywhere for Banaji. 
The sort of practices, activities and relations Banaji identifies become so 
prevalent that all kinds of societies throughout history become in some 
way ‘capitalist’. And as soon as we turn away from the possibility of 
multiple modes co-existing, these societies become unequivocally 
capitalist. Banaji, for example, cites the operation of capitalist industry in 
the Roman Empire. Was the Roman Empire capitalist? Perhaps this is not 
the point Banaji is making, but it does raise the stickier question of what 
was the Roman Empire. 
There are only really two ways out of this dilemma. The first option 
is to claim that capitalism is itself transmodal or transhistorical; that there 
is nothing historically specific about the capitalist mode of production as it 
has essentially existed in varied and perhaps incomplete forms 
throughout most of history. Consequently, the very concept of a mode of 
production in general would dissolve. Would it make sense, for example, 
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to talk meaningfully of feudalism or a feudal mode production, considering 
the extent of commercial activities that existed in medieval Europe? The 
second option is to acknowledge that certain practices – commerce, 
trading, finance, wage-labour, industry – have indeed existed prior to the 
capitalist mode of production but that their existence took on significantly 
different forms, in accordance with the relationship of these practices to 
other social practices and relations.  
The question of what these ‘other’ social practices are is never 
broached by Banaji. For instance, in Banaji’s account, the commerce of 
Genoa in medieval Europe operates hermetically sealed-off from all the 
other non-commercial activities taking place. The sorts of state support 
that Genoese commercial practices rested on were generated by 
numerous non-capitalist forms of extraction, exploitation, coercion, 
obligation and violence. These were not simply incidental to Genoese 
commerce but its very precondition and function. Genoese finance was in 
turn deployed primarily by absolutist states to conduct wars that had more 
to do with prestige, territorial accumulation, proselytising and state-
building than they had to do with capital accumulation. This is precisely 
why a substantial portion of our theoretical preamble in Chapter 7 of 
HWCR builds a distinction between capital and capitalism, not as a 
dichotomy as Banaji reads it, but simply as different concepts.  
To call these ’antediluvian’ forms is not a dismissal – it is a simple 
acknowledgment of their historical existence but in contexts where they 
had not taken on the same power and significance they do under 
capitalism. In establishing this distinction, we are able to recognise the 
existence and histories of certain social relations and forms while also 
acknowledging the historically specific and different ways in which they 
are assembled, often in connection to other disparate social relations and 
forms. Indeed, once we acknowledge the co-existence of this wider array 
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of social practices and relations – this wider assemblage – we need some 
sort of lexicon that might help us describe, explain and ultimately theorise 
it. The lexicon we use – UCD – is, in our minds, exceptionally well suited 
to this task.  
In this regard, Medved asks (XX) why we do not draw on the concept 
of articulation as a way of negotiating this issue. In particular, he suggests 
that articulation offers a way of understanding co-existence that is more 
precise and specific than combination, which seems ‘stretched’ to the 
point of indeterminacy. There are a couple of reasons for our preferred 
use of combination. Firstly, such stretching is precisely the point, as our 
exposition of how general abstractions function in the previous section 
demonstrates. Secondly, rather than being indeterminate, we find in 
combination a thicker conception of co-existence than the one offered by 
articulation. More specifically, articulation provides a way of describing 
how different social forms co-exist and relate but offers no explanation of 
why they do. In contrast, combination already carries within a conception 
of interactivity derived from the concept of unevenness, wherein 
intersocietal determinations that generate the fusion of ‘native’ and 
‘foreign’ are incorporated into its theoretical premises. It allows us to 
recognise variant social practices, with different historical rhythms, 
trajectories, and logics, while also tracing how these practices assemble, 
relate, subordinate, support and contradict each other.  
Without incorporating such relations of difference and interaction 
into our theoretical premises, we run the risk of producing partial, one-
sided histories, starting from the vantage point of capital alone or a 
specific activity or relation therein (it is not for nothing that such Marxist 
approaches starts looking so Smithian). In contrast, Banaji’s approach 
appears to take these pockets of capital as definitive of a mode of 
production and a partial history becomes constitutive and exhaustive of 
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the (inter)societal whole. In turn, those components of social life that sit 
beyond these pockets are deemed irrelevant or left untheorised. Such 
partiality severs and discards the ‘outside’ of capital from our analysis of 
capitalism. In this respect, Banaji and Post/Dimmock/Pal – despite holding 
radically different conceptions of capitalism – are remarkably similar in 
their theoretical disregard for social relations that are not immediately 
reducible to the capital relation.  
The contributions of feminist materialism, queer theory, black 
studies and postcolonialism41 have all shown how such acts of discarding 
not only erase histories and ongoing practices of violence and oppression 
that sit beyond the immediate operation of capital, but, moreover, 
mischaracterise capital (and capitalism) itself. These insights have shown 
how some Marxists have been too concerned with uncovering the internal 
logic and, in turn, the internal history of capitalism at the expense of 
ostensible ‘externalities’ – those relations and practices that sit outside of 
the pristine logic and history of capital.  
Our key claim, following these insights, is that these ‘externalities’ 
matter, that those relations that sit ‘outside’ of capital can fundamentally 
shape, determine, change and destabilise capital. In our case, it is 
precisely this ‘outside’ that is central to the origins of capitalism itself; a 
set of non-capitalist histories which combine, enabling the forms of capital 
Banaji identifies (commerce, finance, industry, wage-labour, etc.) to take 
on an historically unprecedented power and social significance. It is this 
combination, this assemblage, that ultimately constructs the capitalist 
mode of production. 
Once all of this is acknowledged, we need an alternative way of 
articulating societal difference and interaction that does not presuppose 
                                                          
41 See e.g. Lowe (2015), Farris (2015), Chakrabarty (2009), Smallwood (2009), Wilderson (2003), Butler 
(1997), and Hartman (1997). 
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either the capitalist world-system or core/periphery positions. UCD 
provides such an articulation and hence circumvents the reading of 
capitalist logics of intersocietal difference into non-capitalist contexts.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In our response to our interlocutors we have suggested that, firstly, 
Political Marxism remains situated in a internalist analysis due to a limited 
reading of ‘the problematic of the international’ and, secondly, that this 
problematic can only be properly addressed by incorporating the 
intersocietal into the ontological presuppositions of social theory. Thirdly, 
we argued that such an incorporation as a general abstraction is 
desirable, but only insofar as its status as transmodal does not do the 
work of historical explanation. Rather, UCD as a general abstraction 
opens new historical material for sociological analysis and poses new 
questions about how that historical material is handled. Such openings 
and questionings from the perspective of UCD, we argue, provides a 
better starting point for a theorisation and explanation of more concrete 
historical material, such as the origins of capitalism. So, fourthly, we 
argued that our understanding of the origins of capitalism demands some 
articulation of a multiplicity of social relations and how differences 
between these multiple social relations are theorised. We found across 
our interlocutors very different responses to this problematic insufficient, 
arguing instead that UCD is especially well-suited to articulating 
difference.  
As we have argued, each of these disagreements rests on an 
impasse born of fundamental differences in how we understand the 
‘problematic of the international’, the role of general abstractions, and the 
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relationship between capital(ism)’s inside and out, respectively. We have 
also set out what we consider at stake in continuing to hold onto our own 
position in these series of disagreements. In particular, we have argued 
that a proper theorisation of ‘the international’ enables a richer, non-
Eurocentric historical sociology of the origins of capitalism. In turn, this 
alternative historical sociology offers new ways of thinking about 
capitalism in terms of a multiplicity of violences and struggles.  
As this symposium well demonstrates, disagreements over the 
origins of capitalism will likely remain an animating force in Marxist 
debates. And so it should. Our purpose in writing HWCR was not to shut 
down debate or have the ‘final word’, but to open new lines of inquiry and 
research. In this respect, we can only hope that our own modest 
contribution acts to further stimulate – and perhaps even orient – future 
debates. We hope that it might in turn provide a means to elucidate 
various points of productive disagreement among different Marxist 
approaches that could act to sharpen their respective analyses.  
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